

Average weekly earnings of Federal employees covered by unemployment compensation, 1962

Rank and State	Average Federal employees	Average weekly earnings
All States	2,504,131	\$113.29
1. District of Columbia	272,830	136.32
2. Alaska	14,796	135.22
3. Alabama	67,684	121.11
4. California	266,249	118.57
5. Maryland	77,436	117.97
6. Ohio	95,740	117.12
7. Hawaii	27,771	116.36
8. Oregon	22,724	116.04
9. New Jersey	59,783	115.99
10. New Hampshire	13,934	115.80
11. Pennsylvania	136,036	114.93
12. Utah	30,237	113.87
13. Tennessee	39,533	113.35
14. New York	185,735	113.07
15. Florida	65,880	112.83
16. Washington	52,416	112.82
17. Massachusetts	68,196	112.72
18. Colorado	39,007	112.37
19. Virginia	87,809	112.05
20. New Mexico	26,044	111.98
21. Michigan	48,105	110.72
22. Connecticut	16,113	110.58
23. Nevada	7,216	109.82
24. Arizona	22,806	109.47
25. Rhode Island	13,695	109.21
26. Oklahoma	47,220	108.69
27. Missouri	56,048	108.12
28. Wyoming	6,023	108.49
29. Delaware	4,204	108.11
30. Illinois	106,954	107.92
31. Montana	11,528	107.31
32. Louisiana	26,249	107.05
33. Texas	129,770	106.15
34. Georgia	65,545	105.79
35. Indiana	35,776	105.02
36. Vermont	3,522	104.84
37. Minnesota	28,015	104.33
38. Idaho	9,053	103.80
39. Kentucky	32,884	103.65
40. Wisconsin	23,092	102.65
41. South Carolina	28,141	102.37
42. West Virginia	11,699	102.18
43. Mississippi	19,465	101.82
44. Nebraska	19,402	99.41
45. Kansas	25,091	98.66
46. Arkansas	16,630	97.58
47. Maine	9,243	97.34
48. Iowa	20,325	97.15
49. North Dakota	8,504	96.38
50. South Dakota	11,364	95.83
51. North Carolina	37,007	93.17
52. Virgin Islands	14,210	91.19
53. Puerto Rico	9,302	87.62

Source: U.S. Bureau of Employment Security, from tabulations of State agencies.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

McNAMARA'S WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to reply to President Johnson's message to Congress on South Vietnam.

I wish to reply, first, by stating that I completely disagree with his proposal, and to say most respectfully that the President should be seeking to send to the Congress, instead, a proposal for declaration of war. The President of the United States should not be sending to the Congress a subterfuge proposal, a policy of intention, a policy of carrying on a war by Executive action rather than congressional action.

That is my major reason for any complete opposition to the proposal of the administration to continue the conduct of an unconstitutional war in South Vietnam, and to the proposal of the administration to continue to kill American boys unjustifiably in an unauthorized war in South Vietnam.

For what purpose, Mr. President? I repeat, for what purpose?

The need for additional funds to prop up the Khanh government in South Vietnam is only one of many such requests that will be made so long as we continue our fruitless and fatal policy in that country. It is as fruitless and fatal as were the French wars in Indochina and Algeria, and will come to the same end.

We are already financing the Khanh government at the rate of some \$550 million a year. This additional money would raise the figure to \$675 million. That is more than \$49 a year for every person in South Vietnam, and it is exclusive of the cost of our own large military force there.

The effort to keep a "front" government in power is costing the American people well over a billion dollars a year.

Mr. President, we have already poured into that sink-hole over \$5½ billion, including \$1¼ billion to \$1½ billion that we gave to France before its defeat at Dien Bien Phu. All we are doing is picking up the great mistakes of France, Great Britain, the Dutch, and the Belgians in Asia.

It is colonial, no matter what it may be called. Colonialism in the world is as dead as a doornail. American colonialism has no possible chance to succeed, either. This is American colonial policy, and I do not care what semantics the President of the United States uses to describe it.

Despite that huge expenditure, the policy that requires it has not been either explained or justified to the American people.

The President's message stating that more money is needed should be read alongside the report of Robert Moore in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report, in which he said:

Never before have so many Vietnamese officers and public officials lived so well in such a booming economy, injected as it is with a daily dose of almost \$2 million of American money. It is obvious to the Vietnamese who are benefiting from this dole that when the war is over this massive aid will cease, or at least be drastically modified.

The request for more money should be read in light of Moore's additional report that the war effort of South Vietnam is characterized by a lack of will to endure privation on the part of its officers, the selection of officers and commanders for political reasons, the expenditure of U.S. money on luxury living, and by graft and corruption from the huge American aid program.

It is corruption, tyranny, and a willingness to live off the American taxpayer that are defeating the Khanh government as much as anything.

If the administration expects anyone to believe we are supporting freedom in South Vietnam, it should be doing something to bring about the free elections throughout all of Vietnam that were supposed to be held 8 years ago.

I am greatly disappointed that my President in his message to Congress seeks to rationalize and to justify his request for this additional support to Vietnam in the name of freedom.

What freedom exists in South Vietnam?

Where is the freedom in South Vietnam?

We are supporting a totalitarian, military, tyrannical, puppet government in South Vietnam. If anyone believes that the South Vietnam people are free, they could not be more wrong.

I should be glad to support the exportation to South Vietnam and elsewhere in the world of the sinews of economic freedom, but I am not going to support tyranny. I am not going to vote in the Senate to kill American boys to support tyranny in South Vietnam—or anywhere else in the world.

I regret that the administration is not urging free elections in South Vietnam.

Oh, there was some nonsense published in the papers the other day about how there will be an election in South Vietnam.

On the floor of the Senate, I state, "Tell the American what kind of election it would be."

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. It will be a Russian type election. That is the kind of election they will have. It will be the kind of election Diem had, giving the people a list of candidates on which there is only one way to vote, and saying to them, "You vote for them."

Free elections in South Vietnam? They do not have the slightest comprehension of what political freedom means.

I disagree with the President's message. It seeks to leave the impression with the American people that we are supporting freedom in South Vietnam. We are supporting tyranny. We are supporting a military tyrant.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I stated on the floor of the Senate a while ago when he branded me a traitor that this little tinhorn military tyrant in South Vietnam—this General Khanh—is a despot. The United States is strengthening the arm of a tyrant in South Vietnam. Before I go any further, I wish to warn the American people from the floor of the Senate this afternoon, that I am satisfied the plan is on the way eventually to escalate this war into North Vietnam. Of course, we have the clear obligation under the United Nations treaty to take it to the United Nations and not to commit an act of aggression. We have already been caught committing an act of aggression against Cambodia, and the Prince of Cambodia kicked us out. That ended for all time the fallacious domino theory of John Foster Dulles. Cambodia and Burma have left us, and we all know that, except for South Vietnam and Thailand, there is nothing left to the domino theory of John Foster Dulles.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. McCLELLAN. When was that promise or suggestion of free elections made? Was it about the time that we were told we would have all of our troops home next year?

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Mr. MORSE. This was in the last 3 weeks. But they will not be free elections. Those are interesting semantics being used. They said there were going to be elections. From that terminology, the American people would believe that those would be free elections of course. But they are not free elections, they are not free elections over there. It is the Russian type of election which one gets in that part of the world.

No, the sad thing is that my Government should be taking this issue to the United Nations now, and not be talking about a President's message which seeks to beef up the unilateral, military American action in South Vietnam and lead to the probability of escalating the war into North Vietnam.

I hate the Government of North Vietnam. I hate all Communist governments. But, Madam President, I recognize the unanswerable truth in international law that Communist governments have the same right of international sovereignty that a free government has. North Vietnam has the same right of sovereignty which the United States has, and if the United States becomes a party to escalating the war into North Vietnam, then the United States stands convicted of aggression. On the other hand, if we believe North Vietnam has committed aggression, the only legal recourse of the United States is to go to the United Nations with our complaint.

Until we do, we are violating our signature to the United Nations Charter. Before I complete these remarks I shall read the letter I sent to Adlai Stevenson, and the letter I sent to Mr. U Thant, asking when action will be taken within the United Nations in connection with the United States unilateral military action in South Vietnam, which I consider to be completely and totally illegal and without the slightest justification in international law. Senators will note that there is not a word in the President's message which justifies our course of action in South Vietnam on the basis of any international right. We have done it unilaterally; that is all. We are proceeding on our own. Yet we profess that we seek to preserve peace in the world. The sad fact is that in Southeast Asia the United States is a threat to the peace of the world.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Does not the Senator from Oregon fear that we will also be involved in Laos, which now seems to be in the throes of a political upheaval?

Mr. MORSE. There is that great danger. As I said in my letter to Mr. U Thant, I believe there is the great danger of our starting another Korea. If that is so, Senators know what the casualties will be. If we start a war against North Vietnam—and I must repeat this on the floor several times, as I have in the last several weeks repeated it several times—the great danger is that the United States will use nuclear weapons, to the everlasting shame of the United States.

If we start to use nuclear weapons in South Vietnam, we shall increase the probabilities of starting a nuclear holocaust.

I am greatly concerned about this. Let us look at the position in which we are putting Mr. Khrushchev. I believe he has designs to follow courses of action which amount also to forms of aggression.

The Senator from Alaska made a very brilliant speech last week on the floor of the Senate, on which I have already commented, in regard to the alignment which is being developed between Khrushchev and Nasser. The clear implication is that we may be confronted with a threat to the peace of the world, first in the Middle East, and then in the other part of the world.

When that develops, shall we go to the United Nations and say, "Mr. U Thant, you must do something about Khrushchev in the Middle East." Can we not hear Mr. Khrushchev say, "Look at who is talking. It is the United States. What about your action in South Vietnam?"

This is a two-way street in international law, Madam President.

I wish my Government to return to its pledge under the United Nations Charter. I want my Government to make perfectly clear that we want peace in South Vietnam. There is all the difference in the world between a peacekeeping corps through the United Nations in South Vietnam and making war. Pursuing peace is one thing. Prosecuting a war is another.

The sad fact is that the United States is aiding in the prosecution of war in South Vietnam. American boys are dying. It is uncalled for. There is bound to be, in the weeks ahead, a great debate across this Republic, because the American people, in my judgment, must exercise the final say as to whether the United States is to make war in South Vietnam. We have a glorious opportunity to put into application our pledge to the United Nations and, incidentally, to put Russia on the spot.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. If our justification for beefing up our war in South Vietnam is that there is a danger of a Communist takeover, will we not be told that we must do the same thing in neighboring Laos?

Mr. MORSE. Certainly.

Mr. GRUENING. Then we will be taking on all of southeast Asia.

Mr. MORSE. We will be at war on a full scale.

Mr. GRUENING. We are at war there now, though undeclared.

Mr. MORSE. Yes; if we get into North Vietnam and into Laos, does anyone think Red China will send us bouquets?

Mr. GRUENING. Of course not.

Mr. MORSE. Let us be realistic. We are at a great crossroads in Asia. The great danger is that the United States will go down in history condemned for starting a major conflict in Asia, when what we ought to do is say to the United Nations that we will help the peacekeeping corps.

Before I have concluded my speech I shall point out again—it is necessary to repeat this over and over again—that

our alleged allies have walked out on us in southeast Asia. Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, Great Britain, France, and the Philippines, all signatories to SEATO, have no boys fighting in South Vietnam. The foreign minister of Pakistan said in Washington not so long ago, before the Press Club, that Pakistan has no intention of going into South Vietnam. He did not say he would turn down hundreds of millions of dollars in American military aid and economic aid, so that Pakistan can keep itself in a position of making war, not against Red China, with which Communist country Pakistan has entered into agreements, but against India.

Mr. GRUENING. Which we are also supplying with military aid.

Mr. MORSE. Of course I am opposed to military aid for India. I am opposed to building up two powers in that area of the world who will use military aid to make war against each other over Kashmir.

I say most respectfully that the Pentagon is running the foreign policy of our country more than the State Department is running it.

I do not intend to substitute military policy for foreign policy as the posture that the United States will take before the world in the field of foreign policy.

It is not pleasant to stand on the floor of the Senate in such complete disagreement with the policy of my Government. However, that happens to be my trust. I intend to live up to my trust. As one who swore to uphold the Constitution of the United States, I do not intend to support my Government in a policy which I consider to be unconstitutional. Until the President of the United States gets a declaration of war passed by Congress, in my judgment he is acting outside the framework of the Constitution in asking for this escalation of the war in South Vietnam.

I very much regret that the administration has fallen prey to what the late Senator McMahon used to call the "checkbook reflex" in foreign affairs. It holds that money will buy anything. In this case it assumes that any policy can be made to succeed if only enough money is spent on it. But I predict that three times more than \$675 million a year will not keep an American puppet in power in South Vietnam. What the Congress and the American people desperately need, is not a request for more money, and not an inquiry into the American military equipment being used. What is needed is a thorough inquiry into the objectives of this money and military expedition, and an inquiry into the policy that necessitates them, for the present policy in South Vietnam will always necessitate more American money and more American military forces.

If we were to go through with this program, we would bog ourselves down in Southeast Asia for a minimum of the next 25 years. In fact, Great Britain, France, and the Dutch know what it means to be bogged down in Asia. But their people, at long last, made it clear to their governments that they should get out. I say to my government: Once

the American people understand the unreasonableness and the unsoundness of this policy—it will take time—their final verdict will be: "Get out. Stop killing American boys. Take this problem to the United Nations in keeping with what we profess to be the basis of American foreign policy; namely, that we believe that disputes that threaten the peace of the world should be settled by resort to the rule of law, not to the jungle law of military force and might."

That is the great challenge that faces the United States. Instead of marching forward to that great day when the rule of law will prevail in the settlement of disputes among nations, the United States today, in the form of a Presidential message, is in full retreat from the rule of law, and in support, once again, of the jungle law of force. It is regrettable; it is said; but it is the fact.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. Is it not true that before the French finally decided that the war in Indo-China was a lost cause, they had lost 125,000 of the flower of their youth?

Mr. MORSE. They lost more than that, when you consider that in killed, wounded, and missing their casualties were around 240,000.

Mr. GRUENING. Thousands upon thousands of the young men of France were wantonly sacrificed, were they not?

Mr. MORSE. Yes.

Mr. GRUENING. Are we not about to do the same thing?

Mr. MORSE. We shall lose thousands if we follow the course of action that is proposed. The life of even one American boy is too precious to lose.

Mr. GRUENING. I could not agree more with the Senator from Oregon. I have said, I shall repeat now, and I shall continue to repeat that South Vietnam is not worth the loss of the life of one American boy.

Mr. MORSE. I join the Senator from Alaska in that statement.

Mr. GRUENING. I cannot understand why the administration does not understand that it is embarking on a course that will be highly dangerous to this country.

Mr. MORSE. We have a clear duty to American boys to resolve this difference short of war. That is why I am asking the Secretary General of the United Nations to tell us where he stands because, as I commented last week in a speech on the floor of the Senate, he issued a statement from the United Nations that the problems in South Vietnam called for a political solution, not a military one. I could not agree with him more, if I understand what he means. I want to be certain that I understand what he means.

The problems in South Vietnam call for a political solution, not a military solution. Do we think we shall have an acceptable political solution after the passage of an undetermined period of time and the killing of thousands more people in South Vietnam, plus whatever number of American boys are killed? We

shall have the same problem to resolve then. Why not do it now?

It is an old story. As a former arbitrator, I have always been at a loss to understand why both sides to great industrial disputes, when they know that eventually they will have to sit down and settle a dispute by applying the rules of reason, feel that they must engage in the jungle law of industrial strife, with all the loss that it incurs, and then eventually and exactly where they could have been in the first place had they been willing to use the principles of voluntarism for the settlement of their disputes.

Mr. President, before any administration asks Congress to finance a war, it must first ask for a declaration of war, setting forth the causes that require it. Until the administration is willing to present such a declaration to Congress, the request for additional funds should be rejected.

It is said that North Vietnam is sending cadres into South Vietnam, and that South Vietnam is training cadres—although the United States is doing the same thing. It is also said that Cambodia likewise is violating the Geneva accords of 1954, which is the allegation of the United States.

So is Cambodia, and I think Red China is, too. We should not forget that the commission created by the Geneva accords has already found that North Vietnam and South Vietnam are violating those accords, and in so doing it points out that the American military aid to South Vietnam is in violation of the Geneva accords.

What we ought to do is to complain before the United Nations that the Geneva accords are being violated. We did not sign the Geneva accords. Dulles was powerful enough to persuade South Vietnam not to sign them, so South Vietnam is not a party to the Geneva accords, either. But if we believe that a violation of the Geneva accords is threatening the peace in southeast Asia, the United States ought to appear before the United Nations with a bill of particulars and a complaint, asking the United Nations to take jurisdiction.

Of course, such a complaint would be considered first by the Security Council. Officials of the State Department have said that Soviet Russia would veto such a request. But let us put Russia on the spot. I think Russia would veto the request.

But that would not be the end of United Nations jurisdiction. If Russia refused to let the Security Council function under the charter, there would still remain the General Assembly. At that point, the United States should call for an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly and lay the issue of South Vietnam and southeast Asia before the General Assembly. We should let the countries of the world, through the General Assembly, take such action as they deem appropriate in the premises. That would be following the rule of law. That would make all the difference.

As I have said so many times in the last few weeks while I have been discussing this subject on the floor of the Sen-

ate, I am not an "overnighter." I believe that the SEATO nations—those I have already named in this speech—ought to join the United States in helping to maintain a peacekeeping corps in South Vietnam until the United Nations can move in. We could then support the United Nations peacekeeping corps as we do in the Congo, as we do in the Middle East, as we do in Cyprus; although in this instance I would go even further and be perfectly willing to make American boys available for that corps. But that would be an entirely different corps. It would not be a warmaking corps; it would be a peacekeeping corps. It would establish a demarcation between the warring factions. It would say to both sides, "You will have to fight through us if you fight at all." That would make all the difference. Such a corps would fall within the authority and the power of the United Nations.

Do not give me the argument that this could not be done until after the elections; that it would be necessary to wait until after the elections; that it would not be good politics until after the elections, because someone would try to make something out of it if the United States came out clearly for peace. No election is worth winning if it is necessary to win it by coming out for war.

Those who argue thus have little faith in the American people. I have abounding faith in the American people. Get the facts to the American people, and the American people will support peace; enforceable peace; peace through the application of the rule of law, not the military might of the United States or of Russia.

That is why I say we are at a crossroads. I am one Senator who does not think American history would be well served by any such argument of political expediency as: Wait until the election is over.

The American people are entitled to have a government 365 days of the year, including the 365 days of an election year, which will keep faith with our treaty obligations, which will keep faith with our commitments, which will keep faith with our ideals.

The talk to the effect that we cannot follow the program that I am outlining in South Vietnam until after the election, is cheap politics. It has no place in a consideration of what we ought to do in South Vietnam.

Mrs. President, in the absence of a declaration of war that would show why we are pursuing a war in South Vietnam, the United States should accept its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and ask for a United Nations peacekeeping force to be sent to Vietnam.

I have written to our United Nations Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, and asked him whether he believes that our present course of action in South Vietnam is consistent with our obligations to the United Nations.

The letter is under date of May 14, 1964, and reads as follows:

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am enclosing tear sheets from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the dates of May 6 and May 13, in which I

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raise questions concerning your position on the U.S. war in South Vietnam.

As you know, I consider the unilateral military action the United States is conducting in South Vietnam to be completely unjustified under international law and incompatible with our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

I realize that your position as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations is a delicate one. Nevertheless, I think the American people are entitled to know whether or not you agree with the policy of our Government in sending American boys to their death in South Vietnam in absence of a declaration of war. If you do, I think you should say so publicly so that those of us who disagree with such a policy can take your position into account in the oncoming nationwide debate on United States-South Vietnam policy.

Yours respectfully,

WAYNE MORSE.

I also sent a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations under the same date, May 14, 1964. The letter reads as follows:

MAY 14, 1964.

His Excellency U THANT,
Secretary General of the United Nations,
United Nations, N.Y.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I am enclosing tear sheets from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the dates of May 6 and May 13, in which I make reference to you in connection with the U.S. military policy in South Vietnam.

The oncoming nationwide debate in the United States on U.S. policy in South Vietnam is bound to raise many questions as to the obligations, if any, of the United Nations to intervene in the South Vietnam crisis.

Some of us in the Congress are of the opinion that the United States cannot reconcile United States unilateral military action in South Vietnam with our country's treaty obligations under the United Nations Charter. We think that such a course of military action on the part of the United States is a threat to the peace in Asia and may run the risk of enlarging the war into another Korea. We also think that if such military action is permitted to continue without any attempt on the part of the United Nations to intervene to stop the war, there is bound to develop a growing lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the United Nations as an international law instrumentality for maintaining peace in the world.

I realize full well that your position as Secretary General of the United Nations is not only a difficult one but is also a restrictive one. Nevertheless, I think it is important to the future of the United Nations that the prerogatives of your office be exercised to their maximum degree in seeking diplomatic understandings through the intervention of the United Nations aimed at bringing to an end the war in South Vietnam.

Yours respectfully,

WAYNE MORSE.

On March 27, 1964, the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. ROBERTSON) wrote a letter to the Special Assistant to the President, the Honorable Lawrence F. O'Brien. Senator ROBERTSON has given me permission to make use of his letter publicly, which I shall do this afternoon.

The Senator tells me that he has yet to receive an answer to the substance of the letter. All he has received from the White House is an acknowledgment of the receipt of the letter. Senator ROBERTSON's letter of March 27, 1964, reads as follows:

DEAR LARRY: The proposal last night of the Secretary of Defense that we be committed to an all-out war in Vietnam disturbs me very much. In the first place, regardless of how quickly and how easily we may win such a war, I am far from being convinced that the permanent gain would be worth the price of the life of one Virginia boy. My limited contacts with the people of southeast Asia lead me to believe that they lack our capacity for self-government and most of them look upon public office as an opportunity for self-enrichment.

In the second place, I am far from being convinced that the winning of an all-out war in Vietnam would be either easy or cheap. With far more men than I hope that we would ever commit to such an effort, and with the expenditure of vast sums of money, including more than a billion dollars of our aid, France lost the war against the Communists in Vietnam and those Communists were far weaker then than they are today. The primary reason that the French failed was that they could not cut the supply lines of the Communists. And, there was a vital political reason that France lost. She consistently refused to give the people of Vietnam any voice in their own government, although we begged France time after time to do so. The same political mistake is now being repeated in South Vietnam. We begged that government to put into effect land, and other reforms, but to no avail. We do know that those previously in charge of the government lined their pockets with our gold, but the extent to which they did so, we probably never will know.

In light of the foregoing views, I would respectfully hope that the President, before making the McNamara war plans official, will take two preliminary steps:

1. Assure himself that McNamara, who recently has assumed the additional duty of chief of all military experts on all technical problems, has a definite blueprint for cutting the supply lines of the Communists in Vietnam, and
2. That he will ask Congress to approve the Vietnam war.

The excuse that Congress was bypassed when we started the Korean war because we were ordered into action by United Nations was a little thin, and the secret decision that we would fight that war with conventional weapons only, was very disastrous. Because of it, for the first time in our history, we spent thousands of lives and billions of dollars on a war that we did not win. And, what do we have in South Korea today to show for that effort? A people without capacity for self-government and very hostile to us.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

A. WILLIS ROBERTSON.

The Communist-led rebels there seem to be obtaining most of their equipment and supplies by capturing American stores from Government forces, and through desertions from Government forces. I am sure this is why the Secretary of Defense has said the war must be won in South Vietnam itself, rather than by expanding it. Yet he, and the Secretary of State—and now I believe the President—are holding in abeyance the possibility of expanding the war into North Vietnam. The moment they do this, they commit an act of aggression, and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

Mr. President, nothing can be said to justify the President's failure to date to send to Congress a resolution asking for a declaration of war, for under the Constitution he has no right to seek to carry on an Executive war in South Viet-

nam. He has no right to conduct a unilateral war in South Vietnam that kills American boys in the absence of a declaration of war.

I am sure that the Secretary of Defense would like to hold the war to South Vietnam. But the signs are clear and the probabilities are great that it will not be confined to South Vietnam. In fact, we already know of the forays that we have conducted outside of South Vietnam.

I am a little weary of the alibis about poor navigation. When American planes carrying firebombs burn a Cambodian village and kill 16 people and then a plane is shot down killing an American pilot, I do not buy the argument that it was all a mistake.

Let us be realistic about this subject. Making war is an ugly thing. I wish to remove my country from making war. I wish to see my country make peace. I want to see my country use the United Nations Charter as it was envisioned by such great men who have previously served in this body—such men as Arthur Vandenberg, Alben Barkley, and a long of others who brought forth the San Francisco Charter, supposedly—and I still pray that they were right—the greatest instrumentality for promoting the ending of disputes that threaten the peace by the application of the rule of law.

Such a war as is being conducted in South Vietnam requires political steps, not military ones, and more American money and supplies will more likely accentuate the problems than relieve them.

There is plenty of money in the foreign aid pipe line, if we wish to look at the available money, but another objection I have to the President's message today is that it is another attempt to escalate not only the war in South Vietnam, but also foreign aid. I disagree completely, as I said at the beginning, with every premise that the President lays down in an attempt to justify his request for additional millions to be spent for escalating a war in South Vietnam. I recognize also that his proposal is a proposal to escalate foreign aid. I do not accept his argument that he has cut the program to the bone at \$3.4 billion, plus the millions that he has asked for in his special message. There are hundreds of millions of dollars that can be cut from the foreign aid bill, and should be cut. However, if the President wanted to propose more increases in economic projects that would export abroad economic freedom instead of bullets, the senior Senator from Oregon would vote for more money than the President is requesting. I would vote for more than \$3.4 billion in the right kind of economic aid to the underdeveloped areas of the world, including South Vietnam.

But it would be money that would be invested by way of repayable loans in sound economic projects which would help to raise the standard of living of the ignorant, the illiterate, the diseased, and the hungry in the underdeveloped areas of the world who must enjoy economic freedom before they will even have any understanding of our talk about political freedom. We are only

kidding ourselves if we think we can export political freedom. It cannot be done. But we can export economic freedom out of which, as I have said so many times and will keep on saying during the debate, grows political freedom.

The President does not need the money requested even to carry out a design that I think is unjustified—a unilateral military action in South Vietnam. Why, they have so many hundreds of millions of dollars in the pipeline for foreign aid that they have not yet been able to find ways of spending it.

May I say to the President, "Cut down the military aid to Pakistan, the military aid to India, the military aid to Turkey, the military aid around the world to country after country, and we can save the American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars."

When the foreign aid debate gets underway, I shall propose amendments that will seek to accomplish that very end.

I repeat today that I disagree with everything that the President has said in his message that seeks to leave the impression that he is offering a foreign aid bill at the lowest possible figure. I consider him to be completely wrong in that position. The American taxpayers are entitled to have foreign aid cut down to at least the figure of \$2.5 billion. If he would go along with eliminating unnecessary military aid in various parts of the world, he could cut it even further than that.

In closing, I wish to comment briefly on two interesting articles, one of which was published in the New York Times on Sunday, May 17, entitled "How To Avoid Disaster in an Election Year" by James Reston. I have already said that I do not agree with the argument; that the fact that there is a campaign this year for the Presidency of the United States has any bearing whatsoever on what American foreign policy should be, because that argument is really based upon a motivation of expediency. So I offer a caveat to that part of Mr. Reston's argument in which he said:

The facts are that we are now committed; we are not winning; we are not thinking about southeast Asia as a whole but about Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia separately (though all of them are under pressure from the same source in Communist North Vietnam and Communist China), and we are neither prepared to accept defeat nor to extend the war to North Vietnam.

In short, we are trapped in the midst of incompatible forces, none of which is likely in the foreseeable future, either to vanish or prevail.

Neither President Johnson nor Ambassador Lodge, both involved against all expectations in the presidential campaign of 1964, is likely to risk at this time a policy of attack on the Communist north or retreat in the non-Communist south.

Nor are they willing, even if it were possible, to consider negotiating the neutrality of the whole area. They are trapped by the good intentions but presumptions of the past and the foreign and domestic politics of the present into trying to avoid aggression or defeat. No wonder, then, the conversations at the White House this week were solemn.

I reject all those premises. Those premises have absolutely no basis for consideration as to what American foreign policy in South Vietnam should be. They are proposals of cheap politics, politics of expediency, politics of compromise of principle, politics irreconcilable, with the ideals of this Republic and the professing of this Republic that we believe in facing issues that threaten the peace of the world by the application of the rule of the international law.

But we have walked out on that ideal in South Vietnam. We are repudiating that ideal today, and the President's message of today is the last repudiation of that ideal. I regret it. That is why I said at the beginning that I disagree with every premise of the President's message with regard to his position on South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire Reston article be inserted at this point in the Record because, except for the political-end justifies-the-means argument at the end, Mr. Reston has set forth a factual account of the sad and shocking situation in South Vietnam—an account which I think eloquently supports my position that this country ought to change its course of action, and not follow the course recommended by the President of the United States today, but a course of action that is required of us by the United Nations Charter.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

HOW TO AVOID DISASTER IN AN ELECTION YEAR (By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, May 16.—There have been some solemn meetings at the White House this week about Vietnam. Secretary of Defense McNamara went to Vietnam from Germany last week because the reports on the war there were disturbing, and he did not come back reassured.

A number of things have contributed to the anxiety. The Communist Vietcong troops have recently increased the tempo of the fighting around the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon.

The movement of Communist troops from the north along the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos to the south has increased and they are getting bolder. The most recent example was the sinking of a well-guarded aircraft carrier at the dock close to the center of Saigon.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFEATISM

More serious, the desertion rate among the South Vietnamese has recently gone up, indicating a rising spirit of defeatism and, of course, taking American arms to the enemy.

Coincidentally, religious friction has broken out again in South Vietnam between the Buddhists and the Roman Catholics. One Buddhist leader named Tri Quang is now a center of political opposition to the new head of the South Vietnamese Government, Gen. Nguyen Khanh, on whom the United States is now counting, and the Papal Nuncio in Saigon, Monsignor Asta, who has been a stabilizing influence, is being transferred out of the country.

Meanwhile, this unsatisfactory situation in South Vietnam seems to be affecting adversely the western position in both Laos and Cambodia. Recently, Cambodian jet

planes have been penetrating into South Vietnam, and there are other indications that the Cambodians feel that the balance of power in the whole of southeast Asia now favors the Communists.

The situation in Laos, according to official reports reaching here, is even worse. Instead of the moderates gaining in that country, the pro-Communist forces could, it is conceded here, easily take over the whole country any time the Communist strategists in North Vietnam decided it was appropriate to do so.

LESSON FRANCE LEARNED

In historical terms none of this should be so surprising. Washington is slowly finding out what Paris learned in southeastern Asia long ago. After 70 years in that territory, the French came to believe three things: First, that however much the Vietnamese differed among themselves or with the Chinese, they tended to hate each other less than the white man; second, that no major source of Western power could be established in that peninsula right up against the Chinese border, without the acquiescence of the Chinese; and third, that the Vietnamese Communists were tough soldiers.

The French put 400,000 soldiers into the area in the first Indochina war, which ended just 10 years ago. They had substantial help from the United States at the end. That war cost the French twice as much money as the United States put into France during the Marshall plan days, and, what is more important, it cost them 172,000 casualties. But they still lost.

It is not, therefore, astonishing that the United States, with some 15,500 troops who are giving support to a country that has had three governments in the last 6 months and innumerable changes of military and civilian command in the provinces, should be having trouble.

Much could be said about the presumption of thinking American money and advice would win by the end of 1965 a war the French themselves, with all their men and money directly involved, could not win, but that is irrelevant to the present.

THE HARD DILEMMAS

The facts are that we are now committed; we are not winning; we are not thinking about Southeast Asia as a whole but about Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia separately (though all of them are under pressure from the same source in Communist North Vietnam and Communist China), and we are neither prepared to accept defeat nor to extend the war to North Vietnam.

In short, we are trapped in the midst of incompatible forces, none of which is likely in the foreseeable future either to vanish or prevail.

Neither President Johnson nor Ambassador Lodge, both involved against all expectations in the Presidential campaign of 1964, is likely to risk at this time a policy of attack on the Communist north or retreat in the non-Communist south.

Nor are they willing, even if it were possible, to consider negotiating the neutrality of the whole area. They are trapped by the good intentions but presumptions of the past and the foreign and domestic politics of the present into trying to avoid aggression or defeat. No wonder, then, the conversations at the White House this week were solemn.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record another article from yesterday's New York Times, entitled "United States Stepping Up Its Efforts To Save South Vietnam—Long, Hard War Is Expected," by Hanson W. Baldwin.

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There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES STEPPING UP ITS EFFORTS TO SAVE SOUTH VIETNAM—LONG, HARD WAR IS EXPECTED

(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara returned from his fifth visit to South Vietnam last week singing a very different tune from the cheerful notes that followed many of his preceding visits.

It was a dour, even a mournful tune, and nearly all observers in Washington and Vietnam agreed that, if anything, it was not mournful enough.

The war in South Vietnam has been dubbed by many in Washington "McNamara's war" because of the frequency of the Secretary's visits to Saigon, and because of his identification with the policies the United States is following. More properly, it should be known as Taylor's war, since Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is probably even more closely identified than Mr. McNamara with the policies and tactics followed up until now.

Cynical observers believe that, in the midst of an election year, President Johnson is quite content to have the Vietnamese war—a hard, long drawn out struggle—so identified. Mr. McNamara thus becomes somewhat of a political lightning rod.

NATION'S RESPONSIBILITY

Nevertheless, there is little disagreement among top officials in Washington about the importance of the war and its outcome to U.S. interests in southeast Asia. It should, they think, be called America's war. South Vietnam remains, in their view, a cornerstone of the entire anti-Communist edifice we have tried to build in southeast Asia.

If the Communists triumph in South Vietnam, either by bullets or negotiation, it is probable that Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and perhaps even Malaya and the Philippines, will swing sharply toward communism, and the position of the United States in the Far East will be materially weakened. Even more important, the United States may be dubbed a "paper tiger" a label that hurt us materially in Asia after the Korean war, unless Washington demonstrates that this country can successfully meet the Communist tactics of subversion, terrorism, infiltration, and internal revolt, the tactics of insurgency.

Thus, Mr. McNamara's somber report, which indicates a protracted war, increased U.S. military and economic aid to South Vietnam and a probable increase (Saigon reports said a 50,000-man increase) in the size of the South Vietnamese Army, reflected, inferentially, the administration's estimate of South Vietnam's political and psychological importance.

VIETCONG GAINS

Mr. McNamara found that, in nearly everyone's opinion, the actual fighting in South Vietnam has been "hotting up" in the jargon of the Pentagon. The Vietcong have extended their control over large sections of the countryside since the overthrow of the Diem Government. In the last few months the Communists have demonstrated a capability and willingness to slug it out in daytime, with large forces against the numerically superior South Vietnamese. The ratio of weapons lost to weapons captured continues adverse to Saigon; Government defections are still significant. Large North Vietnamese troop movements into Laos, reported a month or so ago, apparently presage a reinforcement of the Vietcong and both trained men and weapons continue to flow into South Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia.

The Vietcong have stepped up terrorist tactics, particularly in the provinces, in an obvious and in many cases all too successful

effort to frighten the peasants into aiding them. Mr. McNamara wore a bulletproof vest from the airport into Saigon last week, a fact the Communists are certain to try to exploit to the detriment of American prestige. At night the Communists still control large parts of the country; and the monsoon season with rains and low visibility which will hamper, though not prevent, air operations will soon start.

The Vietcong in South Vietnam today are estimated to have a trained hard core of full-time professionals, organized in battalions, numbering 22,000 (official estimate) to 40,000 (unofficial but possibly more accurate estimate). These numbers have increased, despite heavy casualties allegedly inflicted on the Communists since 1963. The Vietcong battalions are supported by 100,000 to 125,000 part-time guerrillas, or active supporters; and the Communists are helped passively by a very large part of the population and—negatively—by the apathy of the Saigon intellectuals to the war and their opposition to General Khanh's government or to any government.

The South Vietnamese have been maintaining armed forces of about 380,000 men—about 200,000 in the regular active forces, the rest in the civil guard, civil-defense corps and other paramilitary units. This force is generally judged insufficient, based on experience factors in counterinsurgency wars, to unequivocally master the Vietcong.

Faced with these and other grim facts, Washington and Saigon nevertheless have reasonable confidence that the United States, with increased and improved effort, could ultimately reduce the Communist menace in South Vietnam and make it possible for a Saigon Government actually to govern most of a fairly stabilized country.

The doubts expressed did not question the U.S. capability of achieving this limited victory, but they were concerned with the scope and scale of American efforts, the methods employed, and the off-again-on-again nature of public pronouncements.

Many of the military always have wanted to do more in Vietnam than they have been allowed to do; and many undoubtedly regard Mr. McNamara's proposals for increased aid as inadequate and almost "too late with too little." They note that U.S. military police battalions, withdrawn from South Vietnam only last December in what many regarded then as a political gesture, are now about to be returned, and that talk then of withdrawing most of the U.S. advisers in another year or so has now been abandoned. Plans now contemplate increased commitment of U.S. personnel and money—not less.

What is clearly developing in Vietnam and in this country is a sense of military frustration and public confusion, reminiscent, in some ways, of the latter stages of the Korean war during the truce talks. A long drawn out counterinsurgency or counterrevolutionary war can only be won if military morale remains high and public support is assured.

Yet the military morale of the South Vietnamese forces, shaken by repeated shifts of their commanders, and by regrouping of their forces for political purposes, is in some units apathetic. And some American military men in this country and in Vietnam feel and express a sense of frustration.

The frustration arises from many factors: that the military are being told to fight with "one arm tied behind the back"; that Mr. McNamara's repeated visits and the close supervision of the Vietnamese situation by the Pentagon and State Department have led to overcontrol and interference from Washington; that the Communists are allowed to maintain three secure "sanctuaries" out of bounds to anti-Communist forces—North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia; and that some of the equipment, notably some aircraft, used in Vietnam is obsolescent and dangerous. In other words, the feeling is growing in the

military that the military efforts in Vietnam do not have adequate support from Washington.

In this country public and congressional support for the war appears to have been somewhat reduced by its protracted nature, the failure of Washington to "sell" the public an understandable goal, some resentment at the conditions imposed upon our military forces, and particularly the alternate optimism and pessimism of Pentagon pronouncements and the misleading and sometimes distorted picture released by Washington of conditions in South Vietnam.

NEW APPRAISAL

Faced with this somewhat gloomy military, political and psychological situation, the administration pulled in its belt a notch last week, and prepared to increase its efforts in South Vietnam.

To replace the obsolescent B-26 and T-28 aircraft used in Vietnam, the first of about 76 Navy Douglas Skyraiders were en route. Metal fatigue and old age, and tactical utilization for which the planes were never intended, apparently led to structural failures in flight.

More important than the new planes is the effort to improve and beef up the South Vietnamese Air Force, which to date has played a singularly ineffective role. A new commander has been appointed, and the U.S. Air Force is expected to broaden and increase its training role of South Vietnamese pilots.

An intensification of the training program and an increase in South Vietnamese village defense forces to provide better protection for the peasants against Vietcong terrorism are planned. The regular Vietnamese ground forces may also be increased.

U.S. aid and advice in the nonmilitary field—with finances and economics, in psychological and political aspects, in health and agricultural activities—are also to be emphasized.

DIRECT SUPPORT

There is admiration for the energy and apparent breadth of vision of General Khanh. All current efforts are devoted to strengthening his government; no alternatives are now seen. U.S. policies appear to be based on "sink or swim with Khanh." If there should be another coup—or if General Khanh should be assassinated—there appears to be general agreement that the anti-Communist struggle in Vietnam might well be fatally undermined.

The nagging question remains—whether what we are doing, even given our newly expanded plans, is enough to bolster General Khanh against a serious internal threat heavily supported from without. Most military men probably would answer that question in the negative. Sooner or later, they feel, the United States must fish or cut bait in South Vietnam; i.e., utilize greater effort, including U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam, and/or deny to the Communists the sanctuaries outside the country they now enjoy; or cut losses and withdraw.

The beginning of strong Communist attacks in Laos last week, aided by North Vietnamese troops, and, according to some accounts, by the Chinese Communists, indicated that some additional action might not be long delayed. The dispatch of U.S. troops to Thailand to bolster that country, shaken by events in Laos and Vietnam, has long been under consideration and, if the Communists approach the Mekong, is probable.

Thus southeast Asia once again is in flux and the future position of the United States in Asia is at stake.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, my only comment is that what this military writer points out presents an accurate picture of what is in front of us if we

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One of those honored was a distinguished citizen of Kansas City, Mo., Mr. James Daleo. I want to join in saluting this outstanding humanitarian and wish him many more years of service to his country, profession, and fellow man.

I ask unanimous consent that the remarks in connection with the conferring of the honorary degree of doctor of laws on Mr. Daleo be printed in the Record, and also a short statement on the American Humanities Foundation.

There being no objection, the remarks and the statement were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS OF DR. K. DUANE HURLEY, PRESIDENT OF SALEM COLLEGE, CONFERRING OF HONORARY DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF LAWS, JAMES DALEO

"His word is as good as his bond."

All too few are the men of which this can be said in modern times. But this honoree today is one who can be characterized in this way.

A man of intense loyalties, devoted to his family and close friends, with a stalwart reputation for absolute honesty and integrity, James Daleo has labored faithfully for the welfare of the oncoming generations, not seeking the spotlight, personal praise, or plaudits.

Because of his sincerity of purpose and performance, we single him out for special recognition.

With respect and pride, following the enthusiastic recommendation of the American Humanities Foundation and the directive of the Salem College Board of Directors, I confer upon you—James Daleo—the time-honored degree of doctor of laws. The hood which is now placed upon you, is the appropriate symbol of that degree, and this diploma gives you permanent record of the action here taken.

CITATION FOR JAMES DALEO, ATTORNEY AT LAW, AS PRESENTED BY ZENON C. R. HANSEN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE WHITE MOTOR CO., LANSING DIVISION

I count it a privilege and an honor to present to you a candidate who in every way exemplifies the spirit we are saluting here today, and one who merits our finest recognition.

James Daleo, of Kansas City, Mo., is an outstanding lawyer, having a reputation among the bench and bar of being not only one of the most competent criminal trial lawyers in America but one whose integrity has never been defiled.

From the outset he has applied himself with diligence and intensity to every task which he deemed worthy. He not only received his LL.B. at the age of 19, but was the youngest person to receive a masters from Georgetown University, at the time of his graduation, and was admitted to the bar before age 21, one of the youngest men in America ever to be so admitted.

It is significant that apart from his legal affiliations, all other programs to which he has given his time and talents are related to the welfare of his fellowman.

He is a member of the local, State, and American Bar Associations, the American Judicature Society, the Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers, the National Association of Claimants Compensation Attorneys, and is Missouri State chairman of the criminal law section of the American Bar Association, denoting his stature in his profession.

The roster of his personal affiliations is revealing because of its impact in service to mankind. He is a member of the board of directors of the Kansas City Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America and has served as its legal counsel for 27 years; is serving or

has served on the boards of the Juvenile Improvement Association, the Boys Club of Kansas City, the Kansas City Safety Council, the Catholic Community Library, the Honorary Directors Association of Rockhurst College, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, the Kansas City Commission on Human Relations, and the Kansas City Commission on International Relations and Trade. He has served as a port commissioner in Kansas City. He is legal counsel for Alpha Phi Omega and the American War Dads and for the Crest Lyn Home for Exceptional Children. He is one of the stalwarts in the Youth Council of Kansas City, an unusual organization assisting young people of minority nationalistic backgrounds. He serves the American Humanities Foundation as legal counsel, trustee, and a member of the executive committee.

Because of his devotion to the betterment of life for young people everywhere;

Because of his stature as a God-fearing and community-serving citizen;

Because of his successful exemplification of high principles in the practice of his profession;

Because of his discipline in diligence;

Because of his outstanding reputation for integrity;

Because of his modesty in high office;

And because of his tireless service to the American Humanities Foundation and to the schools and young people that it serves, we recommend him as worthy of recognition, and I am privileged to present him to you as a candidate for the degree of doctor of laws.

STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN HUMANICS FOUNDATION

The American Humanics Foundation came into being to provide effective college preparation for young people willing to enter youth-serving careers but unable to find colleges offering a needed curriculum. It was incorporated in November of 1948 and began operation as a college department in 1949. Its sole purpose is providing desirable education in the field of youth leadership training at the professional level.

Its graduates serve on staffs of youth agencies in 34 of our 50 States, including Hawaii and Alaska; and three serve overseas. About 65 percent have entered professional scouting and serve as Boy Scout staff members in councils of all sizes. Others are serving through the YMCA, YWCA, YMHA, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, Boys Clubs, Catholic Youth Organizations, Jewish Centers, Junior Achievement, juvenile court and probation, neighborhood centers, recreation, hospitals, reform schools—almost all the sound youth programs of our Nation.

This foundation has not resulted from a single major philanthropy but is made possible by the annual gifts of those who have great concern for quality youth leadership and have joined together to do a needed job which they could not do alone.

This is its 15th year, its pilot college program being launched at Missouri Valley College, Marshall, Mo., in 1949, at Salem College, in Salem, W. Va., in 1953, and at Oglethorpe University in Atlanta in 1955.

Its program is twofold: providing desirable college preparation for young men and women entering areas of youth service; and giving personal help on a loan fund basis to those who find it necessary in order to complete college training. The Foundation has accomplished its objectives by affiliating with three colleges and endowing each such college with a complete department, providing the faculty to teach the major subjects, supplying the related library resources, and underwriting the cost of the field trips and workshops which are used to equate theory with reality. Currently there are 158 students enrolled as humanics majors in the three colleges in which the foundation now operates.

In tribute to the 15th anniversary of the foundation's work, Salem College designated an academic convocation to honor the program and its leaders, conferring honorary degrees on three who have been outstanding in their interest and concern. Citations setting forth the worthiness of the candidates reveal them to be outstanding citizens of America likewise, meriting tribute from a grateful nation.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY'S 175TH ANNIVERSARY BALL

Mr. BOGGS, Mr. President, Georgetown University and its alumni association on Saturday presented the 175th Anniversary Ball in joint celebration of the founding of the university and the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.

This ball was the social highlight of the anniversary year, a 15-month celebration which will officially end on December 3 when President Johnson is scheduled to make the closing address.

As an alumnus of Georgetown Law School, I am naturally very much interested in the various events which make up the anniversary year.

And since my State, Delaware, was the first to ratify the Constitution, the joint celebration has special significance for me plus 23 students and 78 other alumni from Delaware who call Georgetown alma mater. One of these distinguished alumni, Judge Daniel L. Herrmann, of Wilmington, is marking the 25th anniversary of his law school graduation this year, and he and Mrs. Herrmann were at the Delaware table Saturday night.

The great age of the university was effectively underscored at the ball by a pageant of American history enacted by the Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps, 1st Battalion, 3d Infantry, U.S. Army.

The 175th anniversary observance is being carried out under the theme "Wisdom and Discovery for a Dynamic World." Georgetown already has a proud history of contributing both wisdom and discovery to its home city of Washington and the Nation, and I have confidence it will strengthen and expand its role in the years to come. I salute the president of the university, the Very Reverend Edward B. Bunn, S.J., for his inspired leadership of the university and its 7,100-member student body, and I also congratulate the Reverend George H. Dunne, S.J., for his outstanding work as director of the 175th anniversary program.

Mr. President, a news story appearing in today's issue of the Washington Post gives the highlights of Saturday's ball, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

YEAR 1789 WAS THE YEAR THAT WAS HISTORICAL

(By Louise Durbin)

Georgetown University has a birthday party Saturday night, when some 3,000 alumni, students and friends turned out to celebrate the university's 175th anniversary at the Sheraton-Park Hotel.

Since 1789, the mutual anniversary of Georgetown University's founding, the ratification of the Constitution, and the inaugu-

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ration of the First President of the United States, "the history of Georgetown University has been inseparably entwined with that of the United States," master of ceremonies, Paul Hume, reminded the audience.

Thirteen princesses, students of Georgetown representing the Original Thirteen States, were presented to the university president, the Very Reverend Edward B. Bunn, and the guests.

The princesses, who, with their escorts, then led the dancers onto the ballroom floor, were: Jane Staudt, of Delaware; Barbara Bitzer, of Pennsylvania; Mary O'Brien, of New Jersey; Ann McCarthy, of Georgia; Marina Forstmann, of Connecticut; Marlene Stacy, of Massachusetts; Anne Donnelly, of Maryland; Margaret Dennis, of South Carolina; Kathleen Roseborough, of New Hampshire; Dona O'Bannon, of Virginia; Motria Voyevodka, of New York; Elizabeth Sparrow, of North Carolina; and Natalie Hindle, of Rhode Island.

Guests entering the Sheraton Hall walked through replicas of Georgetown gates to the grand ballroom, where a copy of the campus statue of founding father John Carroll oversaw the evening's events.

In the grand ballroom, an enormous photograph of the Healy Building served as a backdrop for Lester Lanin's orchestra which played for dancing.

The stage in the Cotillion Room of the Sheraton-Park had been converted into the familiar Old North Porch of the campus.

Honored guests of the evening, who represented the States which were the Original Thirteen Colonies, included Mr. and Mrs. A. J. Donahue, Jr., Connecticut; Mr. and Mrs. James Flood, Delaware; Mr. and Mrs. Thomas B. Finan, Maryland; Representative Joseph Martin, Massachusetts; Mr. and Mrs. Robert J. Funestri and Mr. and Mrs. Donald F. O'Donnell, New Hampshire; Senator and Mrs. Clifford P. Case, New Jersey; William Creech, North Carolina; Colonel and Mrs. H. G. Thomas, Pennsylvania; Mr. and Mrs. J. A. McKenna, Rhode Island; Senator and Mrs. Strom Thurmond, South Carolina, and General and Mrs. Phillip C. Wehle, Virginia.

Cochairmen for the ball were the Reverend John F. Devine and the Reverend Anthony J. Zeits.

WHO IS MAKING MONEY ON THE CATTLE CRISIS?

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, since the beginning of the cattle crisis several months ago, there have been suggestions of profiteering at various stages of the marketing of beef. Today we have approved an investigation of certain marketing practices in an effort to gather more information on this important subject.

The highly regarded agricultural magazine, Farm Journal, decided last month that "because the Government probe will drag on for months or years," it would conduct its own investigation.

Accordingly, Writer Ovid Bay followed a fed steer from a Dodge County, Neb., farm and an Omaha packing-plant to a supermarket in Cincinnati, keeping careful track what happened to the animal and the price every time he changed hands along the way.

The Farm Journal's conclusion: While many beef feeders are losing money on cattle, it could find nobody making a financial killing on the situation. The chief beneficiary, said Writer Bay "is the consumer—at the farmer's expense."

Because of the careful detail with which the article, "Who's Making Money on Your Beef?" has been prepared, I ask

unanimous consent, Mr. President, that it be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

One of the concluding observations of the author is "To say the least, the business of processing and selling beef is a complicated one." This Senator agrees. He, as well as most Americans, will look forward to the National Commission on Food Marketing to shed official light on this business at an early date.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Farm Journal, June 1964]

WHO'S MAKING THE MONEY ON YOUR BEEF? (By Ovid Bay)

We've just had a big hassle on beef imports; now Congress is about to investigate how the food industry buys and prices food. Farm Journal decided to do some investigating of its own right now, because the Government probe will drag on for months or years. These were the instructions I got: Follow a steer from a feedlot through a packinghouse and into a chainstore right to the meat counter. Tell what happens to the animal and the price every time he changes hands along the way. Find out why steaks from a Choice 1,050- to 1,100-pound steer, which brings 19 cents to 21 cents per pound at the farm, often sell for over a \$1 per pound at the meat counter. . . . See if you can find out how the packer and the chainstore decide what the price of dressed beef will be today and tomorrow. And get going—this is Friday and we go to press in 12 days.

AT TED PANNING FARM—\$215.31

I started on the 240-acre farm of Mr. and Mrs. Ted Panning in Dodge County, Neb. They grow corn, alfalfa, and soybeans, and raise about 300 hogs a year in addition to feeding cattle.

As we sorted out the top end of 42 Montana yearlings that he bought late last October, Ted explained that he had paid an average of \$24.05 for them at an average weight of 616 pounds—\$148.15 a head. "I don't have accurate feed records," he said. "But, I figure the gain cost me about 22 cents per pound, not counting all the overhead."

When Ted's cattle and I hit the Omaha Stock Yards, it was a rainy, dreary Monday morning with an estimated 14,000 cattle on hand and a slow market.

After the usual bickering and dickering, Willard Howl, head cattle buyer for Armour & Co., Omaha, bought 17 of the Panning steers at \$20.50 per hundredweight, with 3 others out at \$19.50. Salesman was Bill Yancy, Bowles Commission Co., Omaha.

The steer I'd picked to follow weighed 1,073 pounds, so at \$20.50 he brought \$219.96. Less marketing costs of \$4.65 he netted Ted \$215.31 at the market. Add the average feeder cost of \$148.15 and cost of gain per steer of \$102.08 and each steer cost Ted \$260.23. So, he lost \$34.92 per head on the average.

AT THE PACKINGHOUSE—\$242.50

Next, we moved into the Armour packing plant at Omaha. The 17 steers averaged 664 pounds cooler weight for a 61.45 dressing percent.

Nine out of the seventeen carcasses met the specifications of the Kroger Co. in Cincinnati, Ohio. Three were too heavy (over 700 pounds), 1 graded "Good," and 4 had bruises which discounted the 17 for an average loss of 98 cents per steer to Armour.

The steer I had selected yielded a high-quality, 660-pound carcass. It had about 0.7 inch of fat over the ribeye and graded about "Middle Choice."

The records in Armour's accounting office at Omaha show that it costs them a total of \$18.46 to process one steer. Labor and fringe benefits account for \$9.50 of this, and the remaining \$8.96 goes for overhead such as buildings, equipment, administration and sales, taxes, etc.

"That \$9.50 per steer looks like too much labor costs," I commented to Ed Clarke, beef plant department manager, as we watched 120 people move about 170 cattle an hour through the killing and dressing line. But Hubert Lockard, who has been working for Armour since 1925 and is president of local 8 of the Packinghouse Workers Union, had a different view of it. We found him splitting steer carcasses with an electric saw. He makes \$3.54 an hour at this, and after 39 years is one of the highest paid men in the plant.

We figured that Lockard is making \$141.60 per week, or \$7,363 a year without any overtime. He admitted that this is more than double what he was getting 10 or 15 years ago, but points out that the 6 men in the line splitting cattle are handling as many cattle as 13 men used to and at a faster clip. That's primarily due to the electric saws and better equipment provided by management and Armour stockholders.

Here's what's happened to Armour's labor costs since 1947:

Wage rates and fringe benefits are up sharply. In 1947, the average common laborer at Armour's plant in Omaha was making \$1.02 an hour. By 1953, the rate for all workers under contracts was up to \$1.63, plus fringe benefits averaging 35 cents an hour, to total \$1.98. By 1963, these figures had climbed to \$2.72 for wages and \$1.12 for fringes to total \$3.84 per hour—an increase of 276 percent in 15 years.

I moved on to the sales department where I found that carcasses like the one I had just left were being sold by the packer at 34 cents a pound.

"How do you really arrive at the price of beef?" I asked Dick Shay, Armour Beef Co., as he and other beef salesmen stayed on the phones haggling with one buyer after another all day long. "It is sometimes charged that chainstore meat buyers set the price every Tuesday, and you just record the orders as they come in."

This brought him off his chair.

"Chainstore buyers don't call us up and set the price on anything," Shay exclaimed. "You see us here on the phones talking to meat buyers all over the country—big ones and little ones—us trying to get the last fraction of a cent and them trying to pay the least possible."

I watched and listened as Shay called prospective customers, and it was a two-way street so far as I could tell. He was initiating most of the calls, but there was a lot of beef to sell that day. When a store is short of its needs, Shay gets some calls from meat buyers. Even so, it's a matter of dickering, not dictation, Shay says. For instance, here's how we got 34 cents for these carcasses today.

"On checking around, we found that the dressed beef market was sluggish on the east coast and we still have to keep on selling; the run of fat cattle continues to include large numbers too heavy for most of the store buyers; and the dressed beef market on choice 600- to 700-pound carcasses closed at 34 to 34½ cents in Chicago yesterday," he said. "In Omaha, we average about one-half cent below Chicago (freight differential) so I figure 34 cents is all I can get for these carcasses today. I hope tomorrow will be higher."

AT THE CHAINSTORE, \$301.11

We moved on 331 miles to Kroger's meat warehouse in Cincinnati. It supplies 73 stores in the area with carcass beef. Here the carcass went into Kroger's tenderizer process which tenderizes the meat through controlled temperature and humidity over about

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. TOWER obtained the floor.

MARKING OF GRAVESTONES OF SERVICEMEN KILLED IN VIETNAM

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, there are certain circumstances under which the Federal Government pays for headstones for the graves of American servicemen. But under present regulations it is not possible for the words "Killed in Vietnam" to be placed on such grave-stones.

This matter was called to my attention by the widow of one of the gallant servicemen who recently has lost his life for freedom in Vietnam. She was informed that since we are not officially at war in Vietnam, she would have to bear the expense of having the name of the place of her husband's death placed upon his gravestone.

I happen to think that such an expense is not one which the Federal Government should place upon the survivors of American servicemen who die to protect the liberty of all Americans.

Therefore, I introduce, and send to the desk, for appropriate reference, a bill which provides that, in any case in which the Secretary of the Army is authorized and directed to furnish an appropriate headstone or marker, at the expense of the United States, for the unmarked grave of any member of the military service whose death occurs in the Republic of Vietnam, the Secretary shall, when requested, cause to be inscribed, at the expense of the United States, on such headstone or marker, an appropriate inscription showing that the death occurred while the serviceman was serving in Vietnam.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be allowed to lie on the desk until the close of business on the coming Wednesday, in order to provide an opportunity for other Members to join me in sponsoring the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, will be held at the desk, as requested.

The bill (S. 2850) to provide for the inscribing of certain information on Government furnished headstones or markers in the case of members of the military service who die in the Republic of Vietnam, introduced by Mr. Tower (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at this time I may yield briefly to the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], to permit him to comment on the bill I have just now introduced. I also ask unanimous consent that I may do so without losing my right to the floor, and without having my subsequent remarks counted as a second speech by me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Texas for his courtesy.

I rise to request that my name be added to the bill just now introduced by the Senator from Texas; I wish to be recorded as a cosponsor of the bill. As I understand the spirit in which the bill is introduced, it is to accord this honor to those who have died in Vietnam for the common cause of freedom.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield briefly to me?

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at this time, I may yield to the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, without thereby losing my right to the floor and without having my subsequent remarks counted as a second speech by me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I ask that my name be recorded as a cosponsor of the bill the Senator from Texas has introduced; and I desire to endorse the bill.

Whenever one of our servicemen loses his life in Vietnam, certainly it is proper that he receive the same consideration as that given to any of our servicemen who lose their lives in any other war.

After all, the fighting in Vietnam is a war; and we should do all we can to ease the heartaches of the loved ones of our servicemen who die there.

Mr. TOWER. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.

THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION TODAY

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, recently I addressed the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. On the same platform the previous day was Mr. I. L. Kenen, the executive director of that organization.

Since so many things of importance have developed in the Middle East since that time, I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Kenen's speech of May 3, 1964, printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY I. L. KENEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, NATIONAL POLICY COMMITTEE, MAYFLOWER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 3, 1964

We met just a year ago today. What has happened since our last policy conference?

Last year, our conference warned that the arms race threatened new war in the Middle East. We called for guarantees against aggression. We urged arms for Israel to preserve the balance. And we condemned the misuse of our economic aid to subsidize preparations for aggression.

That was on May 5, 1963.

Three days later, on May 8, the late President Kennedy offered public reassurances in a press conference. He said that the United States supports the security of both Israel and her neighbors and that "in the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations and adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression."

What was the reaction in Congress?

Congress took our concern about Egypt very seriously. In the fall, Congress voted

to bar aid to countries preparing for aggression (the Farbstain-Gruening-Javits amendment). The legislation did not mention any country, but Members of the House and Senate made the legislative record in floor debate. They indicted Egypt by name, both because of belligerence against Israel, and intervention in Yemen.

Despite the substantial congressional vote, the administration was reluctant to stigmatize Egypt as an aggressor because it considered the amendment an impediment to flexibility in the conduct of our foreign policy.

It is intended, therefore, that economic aid to Egypt will continue.

Egypt's foreign currency reserves are vanishing, partly because of disproportionate expenditures for the military and partly because of imprudent purchase of commodities.

Egypt needs new transfusions of hard currency. It has been asking the International Monetary Fund for new stabilization loans, similar to those granted in 1961 and 1962. The bankers at the IMF, however, have been telling Egypt that it must mend its uneconomic ways—that it must cut down on the import of unnecessary consumer goods—that it must ration its hard currency—and that it must pay off the claims of businessmen whose property Nasser seized in his nationalization program.

Bankers are much tougher than diplomats. They insist on fiscal conditions. They will not interfere if Nasser insists on being the neighborhood's incorrigible delinquent. He can redeem himself if he opens up a savings account at the corner bank and makes regular deposits.

History repeats. In 1958, the World Bank told Nasser that he could not get any credit unless he payed off the stockholders for the Suez Canal. Once Nasser agreed, the loan to widen and deepen the Suez was approved—even though Egypt refused to open the Suez Canal to Israel shipping—for it was then argued that it was right to impose fiscal conditions on loans and aid, imprudent and dangerous and counterproductive to impose political conditions. (You will recall that Congress protested against that policy by voting for what is called the Douglas-Keating amendment to bar aid to countries engaged in boycotts and blockades.)

But once Egypt complies with the IMF's conditions, the United States will resume loans to Egypt. In the meantime, it should be stressed that there has been no interruption in the shipment of wheat and other surplus commodities.

Now many of us feel strongly that this program of unconditional aid to Egypt indirectly increases Israel's peril because it enables Egypt to divert its own resources to pay for Soviet weapons and German missiles.

And so our next question is: What is happening to U.S. aid to Israel?

The administration has been reluctant to extend new military aid to Israel. The 1962 decision to lend Israel \$23 million to finance the purchase of the Hawk, an antibomber missile, and to train Israelis in its use, has not been broadened. And economic aid to Israel is being reduced in the current foreign aid bill because, it is said, Israel's economy continues to prosper.

American aid to Israel passed the billion dollar mark in January. It has consisted of grants, loans, and surplus foods, but over the years the emphasis has changed.

Grants have virtually disappeared. The interest rate on loans has risen from three-fourths of 1 percent to 3½ percent—and Israel is being pressed to finance more and more of its development through loans at conventional interest rate.

In 1962, U.S. aid to Israel totaled \$82 million—of which \$45 million was a development loan; \$11 million was an Export-Import Bank loan; \$26 million was for surplus foods.

In 1963, the figure was \$78 million. In the current fiscal year—1963-64—development loans are dropping from \$45 million to \$20 million, although about \$23 million has been loaned to Israel for the Hawk.

But in the next fiscal year, it has been reported that there will be a further reduction in development loans and there will be a reduction in surplus food sales to \$15 million. Israel is hopeful that this figure will be fixed at \$26 million, the same as last year.

These cuts are advocated because of the improvement in Israel's economic position.

Now, it is true that there is a steady improvement in Israel's balance of trade. In 1948, Israel's imports were about 10 times the size of her exports. Last year, exports had risen to the point where imports were just about double the size of Israel's exports. But let us not be carried away. There is still a 2 to 1 deficit.

In Washington we are constantly told that Israel's foreign currency reserves have been rising. Thus, Israel's foreign exchange rose from zero in 1952 to \$582 million last March. In contrast, Egypt's foreign exchange position has been sliding rapidly, from \$1.408 billion in 1948 down to \$752 million in 1952, when Nasser came to power, and down to \$189.2 million last March.

But all these calculations ignore the unpleasant fact that because of the arms race, and because of her tremendous immigration and development burden, Israel has had to borrow very heavily. Today, Israel's foreign currency reserves of \$582 million are not high when we look at her foreign exchange debt, and when we consider Israel's exposed strategic position.

Every Israeli—man, woman, and child—carries the highest per capita foreign debt of anyone in the world—more than \$300 per person—and this is partly because of the imperative need to buy expensive weapons to counter the threat from Egypt.

Under such circumstances, it is logical to urge our Government to reconsider its aid policies:

1. Is it premature to cut economic aid to Israel at this time?
2. Is it right to continue unconditional economic aid to Egypt?
3. Has the time come to extend military aid to Israel?

Our State Department officials apparently believe that they are now using up a lot of our influence in the Near East to avert a conflict over water. They say that we must not roll up the waters further by any action which might put an excessive drain on our influence in the region.

What influence, you will ask?

Well, last year the Department of State told Congress that our influence in the Near East was higher today than ever before. Is this true? And how did it come about? I think the answer may be found in President Kennedy's brilliant personal diplomacy.

Mr. Kennedy was able to gain the confidence and admiration of many government leaders everywhere, partly because he worked to reduce cold war tensions and partly because his fine mind enabled him to appreciate and understand their problems. And it is true that Mr. Kennedy did win the respect and confidence of Arab leaders like Nasser, Hussein, and Faisal.

Yet Mr. Kennedy admired Israel, sympathized with her needs and shared her alarms.

How then does one explain this curious paradox?

The explanation, I think, may be found in Mr. Kennedy's general approach to problems, both domestic and international. He deprecated pressures. And he refrained from pressures which Arabs might regard as inimical and hostile. I remember a speech which he made in the Senate in June 1960, when he said:

"We must formulate, with both imagination and restraint, a new approach to the Middle East—not pressing our case so hard that the Arabs feel their neutrality and nationalism are threatened, but accepting those forces and seeking to help channel them along constructive lines, while at the same time trying to hasten the inevitable Arab acceptance of the permanence of Israel."

Let us recall what happened in 1960.

In 1960, at our first policy conference, we adopted a policy statement which we then took to both the Democratic and Republican conventions. The Democratic platform included endorsements of the concept of direct Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and the resettlement of Arab refugees.

It is true that Mr. Kennedy did call for a new peace initiative. But when he began it, after he took office in 1961, it took a different and disconcerting form.

Now we do not have the official texts of the letters he wrote to the Arab leaders. We do have the texts the Arabs published. According to their texts, Mr. Kennedy indicated that the Jordan River issue was still open. He spoke of repatriation of the Arab refugees. He did not speak of resettlement or negotiations. He said U.S. policy was anchored in the U.N. resolutions. And out of this there evolved the Joseph E. Johnson mission for a poll or plebiscite of the Arab refugees in order to implement paragraph 11 of the 1948 resolution.

Later that year, despite the Democratic platform, to say nothing of the U.N. Charter, our U.S. delegation voted against the Afro-Asian resolution calling for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, much to our deep disappointment.

And yet, just as Mr. Kennedy would not press the Arabs, he would not press the Israelis either—if they felt that the pressure was contrary to their security. And by 1962, I think Mr. Kennedy had come to realize that the Arabs would not change their attitude toward Israel and toward peace. The Arabs were not willing to carry out the Johnson refugee plan. Moreover, the Israelis regarded it as a threat to them. And so, late in 1962, the White House halted the drive for that proposal.

In 1962, when the administration could not dissuade Nasser from adding to its bomber fleet, it was decided to let Israel have the Hawk—a defensive weapon needed to bring down these planes. It also decided to support the Israel water plan.

On the other hand, the administration would not implement the Douglas-Keating amendment, which Mr. Kennedy, himself, had cosponsored in 1960 in the Senate, and it would not implement the Farbstein-Gruening-Javits antil aggression amendment.

Thus, it may be said that Mr. Kennedy was able to appreciate divergent interests. And so the State Department has maintained that U.S. influence in the Near East has grown.

Well, some of us have been skeptical. Some of us thought that perhaps we were hoarding influence, unwilling to risk its dissipation. In foreign policy, it is said, you cannot hoard influence. Influence, unused, begins to vanish. On the other hand, influence used effectively gains strength.

But the United States wants to ration our influence—to exercise it on priorities like stopping Communist penetration, preserving the flow of oil and dividends from the Near East, maintaining communication lines and bases.

Let's take a closer look at American policy. Stopping Communist penetration has long been the major objective of U.S. policy everywhere. But this is especially important in the Near East because the U.S. income from oil investments totaled \$846 million in 1962—and that is one-fourth of all U.S. income

from all overseas investments. And so the United States is determined, because this income affects our balance-of-payments position, to do what it can to shield oil investments from instability, especially the kind engendered by communism which leads to nationalization.

Prior to 1958, U.S. policy tried to curb communism by lining up allies in a divided world. Since 1958, after sputnik soared into space and the Baghdad Pact collapsed, Washington has tried to bar communism by competition for the favor of neutrals. As a result, the United States has itself adopted a neutral posture wherever there is regional rivalry. It is reluctant to align itself with either side, lest the Soviet Union identify itself with the other. The United States tries to avoid initiatives which, it is feared, might, counterproductively, lead to polarization, Moscow at one end, the United States at the other. This is especially true in the Near East, where the United States has always weighed its involvement and identification with Israel in terms of Arab reaction and possible Soviet exploitation.

Such a policy inevitably is vulnerable to pressure and threat. It is often dictated by fear rather than hope.

How does this policy succeed? Who is really winning the Near East?

Here we enter the area of speculation and we encounter the most controversial issue of all. How do we evaluate Nasser? And is communism really losing ground in the region?

Well, you can argue both sides. Hussein seemed to be doing this in Washington a fortnight ago. One day he blamed Zionism for the alleged advance of Moscow in the Near East. The next day he condoned Nasser's neutrality on the ground that the Communist threat in the Near East is really receding.

Mythmakers tell us that Arab nationalism and the religion of Islam are effective barriers against the spread of communism—that Nasser is really anti-Communist. We are told, however, that we must continue our aid and our friendship for Nasser in order to give him an alternative to communism.

In truth, Nasser today has many choices—the Communist Chinese, the French, the Italians, the Germans, as well as Washington. It seems to us that this should actually free him from dependence on both Moscow and Washington. But this also tends to reduce and minimize our own influence in Egypt, despite our vast economic aid program, which averaged \$4 million a week in 1963.

Now it may be true that Nasser is not a Communist and does not accept Communist ideology. But Nasser's army is dependent on Soviet weapons and no army is independent of its source of supply. Nasser, as well as Ben Bella, has embarked on a program of nationalization which is steadily restricting the capitalistic sector in Egypt. Nasser is the prophet of Arab socialism, which increasingly resembles the Soviet system. Moreover, Nasser has steadily propagated hatred against what he calls imperialism. That is translated to mean the United States, just as much as it means Britain, and much more than it means Zionism, i.e., the State of Israel.

So a rising generation of Arabs are being taught to hate the West.

Finally, as we have often emphasized, Nasser's position in Yemen, which he shares with Khrushchev, provides Moscow with a launching pad for Soviet penetration all down the East Coast of Africa—Somalia, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Ethiopia, and the Sudan.

Surely, our experience in Yemen tests the efficacy of our tactics and the accuracy of our intelligence. From the beginning, Yemen was a focus of concern. The United States feared that the Yemen war would spread, engulf Saudi Arabia, weaken Aden,